Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942 (Modern War Studies)

List Price: $34.95 Discount Price: $18.99

Customer Reviews:

Good, but not great [Posted on 2008-08-02]
This book tells the story of the German Wehrmacht's disastrous year of 1942 through a description of the fighting in N. Africa and in the southern part of the Eastern Front. The Eastern Front fighting includes Kharkov in May, the Crimea, Operation Blue in June/July, the advance to the Caucasus, and Stalingrad. The descriptions are more or less the standard ones, and I didn't find much new there. Throughout the book Mr. Citino shows how the German operational style was rooted in hundreds of years of Prussian and German military history.

The book has extensive notes, some over a page long, and it is obvious that the author is very knowledgeable about works published in Germany. These notes alone make this book valuable to researchers interested in WW II. On the other hand, there are few if any references to Russian-language publications, a serious deficiency given the number of military history book which are being published in Russia these days. This is a work of synthesis; I didn't see any primary sources in the notes except for memoirs.

Frankly, the thesis about Wehrmacht operations being a continuation of historical Prussian and German methods could have been covered in a journal article, and the operational descriptions are nothing new. The lack of original research and the absence of Soviet or Russian works is disappointing. I expect more from a university professor and professional historian.

Top notch, but read the sister volume first... [Posted on 2008-09-23]
Along with the prequel of sorts, the GERMAN WAY OF WAR, Citano fully develops the mindset of the entirety of German military thought. As a prior reviewer mentioned, the maps need a little work, but that aside, this is top-notch military analysis. I'd suggest one read the GERMAN WAY OF WAR first, although DEATH OF THE WEHRMACHT can stand alone. Many core concepts, however, are introduced in the inital volume.

Finally, I would not suggest this for the novice reader. One needs a handle of the 'big picture' for all full appreciation of the scope of the work of both volumes.
Best...
Carlo DiVincenti
Metairie LA

A great lesson to learn [Posted on 2008-10-02]
I think the best guide to this kind of thing is the conversation between Beelzebub and Satan in Book One of "Paradise Lost" by John Milton. Satan is quick to learn that even though they are in hell, they still have armies and can keep fighting. Citino notices things like when the Germans could not move as winter came in 1941, an order to retreat would have been impossible to execute, so Hitler's decision that the German armies would stay in place to have some kind of option hoping for rivers of oil in 1942 made the most sense.

World War II had some close things, but life is most interesting when people can reconstruct what went wrong with the best plans some people ever had in their entire life. Death was quite common in World War II, so I do not think that the title is too strong.

A Great Addition to WWII Literature [Posted on 2008-10-25]
This is another superb work by author Citino, although the publisher's editor did a poor job of filtering out typos and spelling mistakes. Nonetheless, I recommend this book to any person who wishes to understand why the Germans were able to do so well, so many times, throughout World War II.

This book should be read AFTER reading Citino's "Path To Blitzkrieg" and "The German Way Of War" in that order. Unfortunately, "The Path To Blitzkrieg" is now out of print, but it is absolutely necessary for the reader to comprehend the nature of German officer training, as well as leadership training down to the Assistant Squad Leader level, No other army in history has been so thorough in training its leaders; the American Army being no exception in spite of incorporating much of the Wehrmacht's leadership training techniques in its training regimen after World War II. Unfortunately, American officer training is a mere shadow of the German even today, particularly in staff functions, both due to far-foreshortened courses and missing a General Staff for guidance and espirit. Please read my reviews of both books here on Amazon.

This work applies the lessons learned from other two books to the year of 1942 for the Germans on two fronts, the Soviet Union and North Africa. Both fronts demonstrate the same principles of waging war from the German side with aggressive and capable commanders, excellent staff support, and incredible performances by the ordinary soldiers doing their duty.

In many respects the North African campaign was a unimportant sideshow (to the Germans, but not to the Italians or British), and the inability of the Italians to successfully supply Rommel's army across the Mediterranean Sea (due to Ultra decoding of sailings and convoy information) not only prevented Rommel from taking Egypt, but brought him within an ace of losing his entire army. Citino's analysis of Rommel's actions and the slow, even almost dim-witted British methodology in waging war was brilliant. Montgomery turned all his battles into ones of attrition using overpowering resources, and the German tactics of using movement to compensate for inferior numbers and material became a non-starter. Nonetheless, when the Germans could accomplish rapid movements and bring adequate power to its main point of effort, the Wehrmacht could still win local victories against the British (& Americans) as late as the winter of 1944/45.

On the Eastern Front, the campaign of 1942 was decisive. Citino presents the recovery of the Wehrmacht in the Spring of 1942, not as fully regaining its 1941 strength, but to a level whereby it could regain the initiative. Citino correctly points out the recent official German history as containing prescient discussions by already knowing the outcome when the information available at the time would not lead to those conclusions. As the author stresses, believing that the superior leadership of the German officer corps and the superior training and bravery of German troops would overcome gross deficiencies in men and material might have been hubris, but the German officers and men apparently actually believed it. As a result, they were able to push far beyond the culmination point, and achieve much more than could reasonably be expected. In many situations the results were achieved by the smallest of formations, -- a handful of tanks or a few hundred men left effective out of a whole division. In a sense, the Germans pushed themselves to win with the last man standing, something no other army has consistently attempted to do in modern times. Author Citino marvels that the Germans were able to come within two miles of their objective in the Caucasus, and even De Gaulle was similarily impressed. When De Gaulle remarked while touring Stalingrad after the war that the fight there was unbelievable, a Soviet general agreed that the Soviet troops had performed great heroics. "No, no," De Gaullle said, "That the Germans got so far."

Citino correctly did not put all the blame on Hitler for the debacle, but he should have lessened the influence from Megargee and Wette when it came time to spread the blame lower than Halder and the OKW/OKH. The operational command system began to fall apart when the traditional independence of German commanders was restricted by headquarters. These were new rules, and the German field commanders were unable to adjust for the good of their commands and the conduct of the war. Of course it did not help that tanks, ammunition, food, manpower, air support, and especially fuel were in desperately short supply, but these were problems that the Wehrmacht had surmounted before. In the 2nd half of 1942 it could not. The whys and wherefors make up this book.

The author did not overlook the effect of the Soviet retreats before the Wehrmacht became stretched to the limit, and that too was known to the German high command. But the attack simply could not be stopped -- German tradition required that it be pressed to the limit. It was, and defeat resulted.

Although Manstein would achieve a monumental success in February and March of 1943 in destroying or crippling four Soviet armies and retaking Kharkov and Belgorod, the German bolt had been shot. From Kursk onward, only localized successes were possible when the Wehrmacht was able to maneuver -- remaining in fixed positions meant certain eventual defeat. Eisenhower would adopt a similar strategy as the Soviets and grind down the German army without giving it a chance to maneuver. The German way of war could not cope nor adjust. A not-so-modern army in command thinking and warrior attitudes could not ultimately prevail against a modern army (or armies) fighting battles of attrition and using overwhelming superiorities in the air, on the ground, and in industrial production of military supplies and equipment.

Purchase and read this book.

Conciso repaso a la Wehrmacht en 1942. [Posted on 2008-10-28]
Death of the Wehrmacht es un libro que da un repaso a los principales escenarios en que la Wehrmacht participó durante todo 1942: La guerra en el Este y la guerra en África. El nombre ya es bastante significativo, el año de la "muerte" del Ejército Alemán, el año del turning-point, donde dos son las batallas que llevan la égida de la hecatombe: Stalingrado y El Alamein.

Comienza dando un repaso a 1941 (Balcanes, Grecia, Barbarroja, Moscú), pasando luego a 1942 por Crimea, la batalla de Kharkov (Saliente de Izyum), Azul, el Cáucaso y Stalingrado. Eso en el Este. Y en África, prácticamente da un repaso desde marzo del 41 ( somero) para luego llegar hasta finales del 42 con la derrota en El Alamein. El libro sigue una estructura muy amena, ya que los capítulos del Este y del desierto van intercalados, y por tanto es siempre imposible llegar a cansarse de algún escenario.

Citino basa sus conclusiones no sólo en fuentes primarias, sino que la mayoría son secundarias, pero no por ello me parece que sean menos buenas. En general sigue bastante la línea de opinión de la Historia Oficial de Alemania en la Segunda Guerra Mundial (GOH). Hay algunos aspectos que me han llamado la atención: Por ejemplo su opinión con respecto a la actuación ( a nivel estratégico) de Rommel crítica, tal y como lo hace la GOH, o también su crítica a Manstein, el cual se defiende en sus memorias tratando de eximirse de culpa sobre la toma de decisiones acerca del ejército cercado de Stalingrado. Creo que un aspecto básico de su libro es el desarrollo de Azul. Citino explica cómo en Azul se trató de hacer el modo de guerra que se hizo en Barbarroja, sitiando, envolviendo y destruyendo ejércitos, creando kessels, pero por el contrario lo que se encontró fue, en principio, un ejército Rojo casi en desbandada; digamos que un ejército que no se dejaba envolver, que cedía más y más terreno, con el consecuente aumento de la longitud de las líneas de suministro alemanas, crecimiento del frente y dispersión de más tropas. Eso, sumado a algunas decisiones bastante desafortunadas desde lo más alto y al suministro sin fin de hombres de la Gran Patria dejaron un ejército en colapso.
Siempre resulta interesante leer acerca de la guerra en el Cáucaso. En mi opinión, las páginas dedicadas aquí a ello sintetizan con maestría lo que fue aquella aventura, que tan infausto recuerdo dejó en más de un alemán.

Es evidente que Citino conoce bastante del acervo castrense de la casta de militares Prusianos, creado durante más de tres siglos, desde Federico el Grande. Un aspecto que defiende es que el modo de hacer la guerra que tantos éxitos había deparado durante 3 siglos a los militares prusianos se topó con una nueva forma de hacerla, fundada básicamente en la producción industrial de las naciones, en carreras por obtención de materias primas, en la Guerra Total (Por cierto, este término no es utilizado en ningún momento por Citino). En este tipo de guerra Alemania lo tenía mucho más difícil.

Sin duda lo que más me gustó del libro es el despliegue bibliográfico que comenta y discute el señor Citino, reflejado en más de 100 páginas de notas y bibliografía. No tienen por qué ser todas las fuentes usadas fuentes primarias. La mayor parte son secundarias, lo que no hace que sus síntesis sean menos concluyentes. ¡ Cuántos libros en alemán usa! ¡¡ Y no traducidos al inglés!! Esta segunda exclamación es aún más sorprendente. Un mercado insaciable como parece que es el de los libros en inglés sobre la Segunda Guerra Mundial, y el trabajo que queda por delante.
La edición es muy buena, el formato con tapa dura típico de University Press of Kansas. Los mapas son muy claros y suficientes, si bien podría haber algunos más.

Click here for more details and discount information...